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Criminal Procedure
Alternatives to Jail Time: Overcrowding and Nonviolent
Driving Offenders
M. R. Carrillo-Heian
Code Sections Affected
Vehicle Code § 14601.9 (new).
AB 1311 (Romero); 1999 STAT. Ch. 122
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1980 and 1994, the U.S. adult jail population rose from 163,994 to
490,442, a 199% increase.' These increases in the jail population have contributed
to an unfortunate overcrowding problem.2 In mid-1998, the nation's jails were
operating at 97% of their rated capacity, holding an estimated 664,847 individuals
For lack of a better solution, some jurisdictions have been releasing inmates early
or simply not booking misdemeanor suspects into jail. Solutions to overcrowding
have included "double-bunking" 5 prisoners, expanding existing facilities, and
building new facilities, but counties continue to look for alternatives.6 In response
to the overcrowding problem, the California Legislature enacted Chapter 122 to
establish a pilot program to provide an alternative to jail time for certain nonviolent
offenders.
1. JOHN IRWIN &JAMES AUSTIN, IT'S ABoUTTIME: AMERICA'S IMPRISONMENT BINGE 3 (1997).
2. David Parrish, Jails Are Overcrowded, But County Coffers Aren't, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 28,
1998, at A6, available in 1998 WL 2620639.
3. DARRELK. GILLIARD, U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, PRISONANDJAILINMATES ATMIDYEAR 19981 (1999).
4. Parrish, supra note 2, at A6.
5. "Double-bunking" means that twice as many bunks are installed in the existing number of cells,
effectively housing twice as many prisoners in the same amount of space. Pamela Martineau, Judge Will Allow
Double-Bunking at Downtown Jail, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 21, 1998, at Bi. This is achieved at a lower cost than
constructing entirely new facilities. Id.
6. Parrish, supra note 2, at A6; see also Martineau, supra note 5, at B 1 (discussing alternatives for dealing
with overcrowding and potential benefits from double-bunking prisoners).
7. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14601.9 (enacted by Chapter 122); see infra text accompanying note 28 (limiting
application of Chapter 122 to non-injury, non-DU driving offenses involving suspended or revoked drivers'
licenses).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. California's Overcrowding Problem
In California, the jail population increased by 118% between 1981 and 1994.8
At the same time, correctional spending increased by 323%.9 Despite this increase
in spending, the jurisdiction with the highest average daily jail population, Los
Angeles County, was still at 100% capacity at midyear 1998.10 Nationwide, of the
twenty-five largest jail jurisdictions in mid-1998, seven were in California, and all
of them were occupied at more than 90% capacity." Orange County jails had the
highest occupancy rate by far, at 145% of capacity.12 Of these twenty-five
jurisdictions, California's San Bernardino and Orange Counties reported the largest
increases in population.'
3
B. Public Attitudes Toward Alternative Punishments
According to opinion polls, a majority of Americans list crime as a major
concern, think that offenders should be punished, and believe that punishments
should generally be more harsh than they currently are.14 However, people are
willing to consider other factors, such as overcrowding and incarceration costs,
8. See IRWIN & AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 150 (stating that the California jail population increased from
34,064 to 74,269 between 1981 and 1994).
9. Id. Since 1990, operation costs of state correctional systems have been more than $5 billion annually.
Id,
10. GILLIARD, supra note 3, at 8. Since at least 1988, with the exception of midyear 1996, Los Angeles
County has been the jurisdiction with the highest a'erage daily jail population. See GILLIARD, supra note 3, at
8 (showing the average daily jail population of the Los Angeles County jail jurisdiction for the years 1996 to
1998); DARRELL K. GILLiARD & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, 1995 12
(1996) (showing the average daily jail population of the Los Angeles County jail jurisdiction for the years 1993
to 1995); CRAIO A. PERKINS Er AL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAILS AND JAIL INMATES 1993-94 7 (1995) (showing
the average daily jail population of the Los Angeles County jail jurisdiction for the years 1988 to 1994).
11. GaLIARD, supra note 3, at 8. "Percentage of occupation" is the ratio of all inmates to total capacity.
The other California jurisdictions among the twenty-five largest were San Diego County (10th, 104% capacity),
Orange County (12th, 145% capacity), San Bernardino County (13th, 114% capacity), Santa Clara County (14th,
123% capacity), Alameda County (17th, 91% capacity), and Sacramento County (21st, 94% capacity). Id. These
seven California jail jurisdictions together hold approximately eight percent of the nation's jail inmates, Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Between midyear 1997 and 1998, San Bernardino County's jail population increased by 37.5%,
and Orange County's increased by 13.3%. lal The average daily population of these two jurisdictions has been
increasing steadily since at least 1988. See GILLIARD, supra note 3, at 8 (showing the average daily jail population
of the Orange County and San Bernardino County jail jurisdictions for the years 1996 to 1998); GILIUARD &BECK,
supra note 10, at 12 (showing the average daily jail population of the Orange County and San Bernardino County
jail jurisdictions for the years 1993 to 1995); PERKINS ETAL, supra note 10, at 7 (showing the average daily jail
population of the Orange County and San Bernardino County jail jurisdictions for the years 1988 to 1994).
14. Jo:ly L. Sundt, Is There Room for Change? A Review of Public Attitudes Toward Crime Control and
Alternatives to Incarceration, 23 S. ILL. U. LJ. 519, 520 (1999).
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when forming opinions about appropriate types of punishment.'5 The public
certainly feels that violent offenders should go to prison, but it is willing to concede
that perhaps nonviolent offenders could be punished in an alternative, more
community-based manner.16 Jurisdictions are turning to alternative punishments in
increasing numbers, 7 and a majority of people polled in one study viewed
alternative programs such as intensive supervision, probation and electronic
monitoring (EM) 8 as effective ways to protect the community while still relieving
overcrowding. 9 In California, a 1991 survey found a vast majority of respondents
preferring that the State utilize more restrictive punishments than probation, but less
expensive methods than sending offenders to prison.2"
C. Treatment of Certain Misdemeanor Traffic Offenders Under Existing Law
Generally, local jail facilities confine individuals before or after adjudication,
usually holding inmates with sentences of up to one year.2' In California, every
misdemeanor offender has the right to ajury trial, which can be costly to the state.22
These costs have prompted the Legislature to consider diverting some misdemeanor
offenders from the court system.23 Prior to Chapter 122, county district attorneys
were prohibited from establishing any diversion programs for drivers charged with
misdemeanor driving offenses.24 Existing law prohibits people from driving when
their driver's licenses have been suspended or revoked. Penalties for violations not
15. Id. at 524.
16. Id at 525.
17. GiLuiARD, supra note 3, at 5. In 1995, 34,869 of the 541,913 persons under jail supervision were
located outside ajail facility. Id. In 1996,72,977 of 591,469 persons were under outside supervision, while 1997
figures show that 70,239 out of 637,319 persons were under outside supervision, and 1998's statistics reveal that
72,385 out of 664,847 were under outside supervision. I.
18. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (explaining the use of an EM system).
19. Sundt, supra note 14, at 526-27.
20. Id. at 527.
21. GILUARD, supra note 3, at 5.
22. CAL CONST. art. I, § 16; see Mills v. Mun. Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 288, 299, 515 P.2d 273, 281 (1973)
(comparing the federal right to ajury trial with the right to ajury trial in California).
23. See ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEEON PUBUiC SAFETY, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1311, at3-4 (May 11,
1999) (opining that courts and prosecutors would find prosecuting crimes against people and property to be a
better use of judicial resources).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.51(c)(6) (West 1985) (prohibiting diversion of any "driving offense
punishable as a misdemeanor pursuant to the Vehicle Code"). Chapter 122 is applicable only to violations of
California Vehicle Code sections 14601, 14601.1, and 14601.3. CAL VEH. CODE § 14601.9(a) (enacted by
Chapter 122); see also infra notes 25-26 (detailing the provisions of Vehicle Code sections pertaining to driving
with a suspended or revoked license, which include these three).
25. See CAL VEH. CODE § 14601 (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting driving with a driver's license suspended
or revoked for negligent or reckless driving); id. § 14601.1 (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting a driver from driving
when her driver's license is suspended or revoked for reasons other than those listed in sections 14601, 14601.2,
and 14601.5); iU § 14601.2 (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting a driver from driving when his driver's license is
suspended or revoked for driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or any drug); id. § 14601.3 (West
Supp. 2000) (designating drivers as "habitual traffic offenders" if they amass a certain number of convictions or
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resulting in bodily injury consist of jail time, fines, or a combination of both, and
are assessed according to the circumstances under which the arrest was made or the
license revoked.26
III. CHAPTER 122
Chapter 122 allows district attorneys of certain counties 27 to establish an
alternative program for persons who are found guilt, of non-DUI, non-injury
driving offenses involving suspended or revoked drivers' licenses, or for persons
pleading guilty or no contest to such offenses.28 Under the new law, the district
attorneys of these counties may now enter into written agreements with offenders
for participation in the program in lieu of jail sentences. 29 The court, in its
discretion, may order the offender to comply with the agreement." These
agreements require the offender to complete the elements of the program within
sixty days, or within the term of the maximum jail sentence allowed under the
accidents by driving while their driver's license is suspended or revoked); id. § 14601.4 (West Supp. 2000)
(mandating imprisonment for a driver who causes bodily injury while driving when her driver's license has been
suspended or revoked); id. § 14601.5 (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting a driver from driving when his driver's
license has been suspended or revoked for refusal to take a blood-alcohol test or for having a blood-alcohol
concentration in excess of the legal limit).
26. See id. § 14601 (West Supp. 2000) (imposing for a first conviction a fine of $300 to $1000 and
imprisonment in the county jail for five days to six months, and a fine of between $500 and $2000 and
imprisonment in the county jail for ten days to one year for a conviction occurring within five years of a
conviction for a prior similar offense); id. § 14601.1 (West Supp. 2000) (imposing a fine of between $300 and
$1000 or imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months, or both a fine and imprisonment, for the first
conviction, and a fine of $500 to $2000 and imprisonment in the county jail for five days to one year for a
conviction occurring within five years of a conviction for a prior similar offense); id. § 14601.2 (West Supp. 2000)
(imposing a fine of $300 to $1000 and imprisonment in the county jail for ten days to six months for the first
conviction, and a fine of $500 to $2000 and imprisonment in the county jail for thirty days to one year for a
conviction occurring within five years of a conviction for a prior similar offense); id. § 14601.3 (West Supp. 2000)
(imposing a fine of $1000 and imprisonment in the county jail for thirty days for the first conviction, and a fine
of $2000 and imprisonment in the county jail for 180 days to one year for a conviction occurring within seven
years of a conviction as a "habitual traffic offender"); I d § 14601.5 (West Supp. 2000) (imposing a fine of $300
to $1000 instead of or in addition to imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months for the first conviction,
and a fine of $500 to $2000 and imprisonment in the county jail for ten days to one year for a conviction occurring
within five years of a conviction for a prior similar offense); see also supra note 25 (indicating the conditions
under which these penalties may be imposed for driving with a suspended or revoked driver's license).
27. The counties that may participate in the Chapter 122 pilot program are Alameda, Kern, Los Angeles,
Orange, Placer, Sacramento, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, and Santa Barbara. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14601.9(a)
(enacted by Chapter 122).
28. See id. (including only persons convicted of violations of Vehicle Code sections 14601, 14601.1, or
14601.3 for participation in the program); see also supra note 25 (relating the activities that these code sections
prohibit).
29. Id § 14601.9(b) (enacted by Chapter 122).
30. Id.
322
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section violated, whichever is longer.31 The court may still impose a fine upon any
person who is ordered to participate in the program.32
The Chapter 122 program consists of two major elements: (1) a home-detention
program requiring the use of an EM system;33 and (2) one or more classes
conducted through the district attorney.' The court may allow a person to perform
certain activities, such as attending school or work, while enrolled in the home-
detention program. The classes are to provide information on the following: (1)
the requirements imposed by certain Vehicle Code sections, including the penalties
imposed for violation of these laws; 36 (2) transportation alternatives available to
persons who do not have a valid driver's license; 37 and (3) the procedures for
regaining the right to drive.38
Fees for the program may be recovered from offenders who participate,39
subject to modification or waiver by the district attorney, based on the offender's
financial position.40 Nevertheless, inability to pay the fees is not a ground for denial
of participation in the program.41
Every district attorney of every county that participates in the program must
submit a report to the California Legislature by December 31, 2003, regarding that
county's participation in the program.42 The pilot program created by the new law
is to remain in effect until January 1, 2004.43
31. Id.
32. Id. § 14601.9(d) (enacted by Chapter 122).
33. The home-detention program and electronic monitoring program must comply with California Penal
Code section 1203.016, which specifies the requirements for any home-detention program used in lieu of a jail
sentence. CAL PENAL CODE § 1203.016 (West Supp. 2000). Those participating in a home-detention program are
required to remain in their homes during specified hours that are determined by an administrator. l
§ 1203.016(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000). Electronic monitoring is used to verify compliance with the program. Id
§ 1203.016(b)(3) (West Supp. 2000). If the monitoring devices malfunction, or if a violation of the detention
provisions occurs, the participant must agree that she may be taken into custody without further action by the
court. Id. § 1203.016(b)(4) (West Supp. 2000).
34. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14601.9(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 122).
35. Id. § 14601.9(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 122).
36. IdU § 14601.9(b)(2)(A) (enacted by Chapter 122). The Vehicle Code provisions involved are sections
14601, 14601.1, and 14601.3. Id. § 14601.9(a) (enacted by Chapter 122); see supra note 25 (detailing the
prohibitions contained in California Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 14601.1 to 14601.5); supra note 26 (listing
the penalties applicable to those Vehicle Code sections).
37. CAL VEH. CODE § 14601.9(bX2)(B) (enacted by Chapter 122).
38. Id. § 14601.9(b)(2)(C) (enacted by Chapter 122).
39. Fees are based on a schedule approved by the district attorney or the board of supervisors, or the
designee of the district attorney Id. § 14601.9(e) (enacted by Chapter 122).
40. ld.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 14601.9(0 (enacted by Chapter 122).
43. Id. § 14601.9(g) (enacted by Chapter 122).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
Chapter 122 is intended to divert offenders from the formal court system into
home-detention/EM systems, in response to fiscal concerns raised by prosecutors
and courts on behalf of taxpayers. ' While cost is a concern, the public also wants
to be sure that offenders are punished for their crimes, and that the community is
safe.45 Most reports from existing home-detention/EM programs indicate that the
programs are generally successful at achieving these goals. 6 This success, coupled
with the public's belief that such programs promote responsibility among offenders,
has led to increasing public support for home-detention/EM programs.47
A. Effectiveness of Electronic Monitoring
EM technology is relatively new.4s In an EM program, an offender wears an
electronic transmitter to verify her whereabouts.49 In Chapter 122's program, as in
many programs, EM is coupled with home-detention.50 The use of EM is on the
rise; by 1995, twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government were using EM for individuals on probation or parole.5' By midyear
1998, over 10,000 persons of the approximately 72,000 persons supervised outside
a jail facility were in EM programs.52
44. See ASSFMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEEANALYSIS OFAB 1311, at 3-4 (May 11,
1999) (stating that "prosecutors and courts may justifiably prefer to use scarce courtroom resources" for more
serious offenses).
45. Sundt, supra note 14, at 520.
46. Mark E. Bums, Comment Electronic Home Detention: New Sentencing Alternative Demands Uniform
Standards, 18 J. CoNTEMP.L. 75,86-87 (1992). Increased interest in EM has been prompted by various concerns,
including a lack of faith in traditional solutions and a desire to reduce recidivism rates in view of increasing crime
rates, overcrowding, and lack of funding for new facilities. Id. at 80-81.
47. Id. at 86-87. The idea of responsibility is inherent in the fact that if an offender is participating in a
home-detention/EM program, he is participating in society and, for instance, can still work, thus keeping his
family off of welfare. I.
48. See Developments in the Law-Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1863, 1895 (1998)
(reporting that the first use of an EM system was inspired by aSpiderman comic strip in 1979, but no EM program
was implemented until 1984). See generally Bums, supra note 46, at 78-92 (recounting the history of EM, its uses,
and its advantages and disadvantages).
49. See Spiderman's Net: An Electric Alternate to Prison, TIME, Oct 14, 1985, at 93 (providing
descriptions of then-existing EM systems and their potential uses); Robert N. Altman & Robert E. Murray, Home
Confinement: A 90's Approach to Community Supervision, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1997, at 30-32 (detailing the
operation of an EM system and providing figures for cost evaluation).
50. CAL VEil. CODE § 14601.9(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 122); see supra note 33 (ditcussing the general
provisions of any home-detention system used in lieu of a jail sentence under California law).
51. Developments in the Law-Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 48, at 1895-96.
52. GITJARD, supra note 3, at 5. This number increased from 6,788 in EM programs in 1995 to 10,827
in 1998. U.
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The costs and benefits of EM programs are difficult to assess due to conflicting
reports. 53 Implementing a home-detention/EM system is generally less costly than
putting the offender in jail, and many in the corrections industry believe that the
public is protected just as well under such a program as if the offender were in a
jail.m Opponents of such systems are mainly concerned about opening the door to
more intrusive surveillance methods, such as implanting devices in participants'
bodies, installing video cameras in participants' homes, or other methods that
would raise potential privacy issues.5 Other opponents are concerned that offenders
will receive a harsher punishment with EM than they would normally receive if
they were released on parole.5 6 This is less of a concern with Chapter 122 than it is
with other EM programs, because the offenders who participate in the pilot program
would be subject to a jail sentence and fine, rather than parole.57 Still others
disagree with those in the corrections industry, believing that imposing punishments
such as EM does not send the right message; they believe that incarceration is most
appropriate to emphasize disapproval of criminal acts.58
B. Chapter 122, Overcrowding, and Public Opinion
Alternative methods of punishment are an experiment in corrections, prompted
by rising costs and overcrowding.59 The Legislature has been careful to limit the
offenders who may participate in the pilot program to persons whose offenses are
relatively minor.6 If these offenders would not be punished enough under the
current system,61  Chapter 122 improves the situation by ensuring that such
criminals receive punishment comparable to those provided by law. The new law
53. See Kevin E. Courtright et al., The Cost-Effectiveness of Using House Arrest with Electronic
Monitoring for Drunk Drivers, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1997, at 19, 19 (reporting that some studies have found
EM programs coupled with house arrest to be cost-effective, other studies have found them to be too expensive
or not effective in reducing overcrowding, and still other reports have found inequities in imposing EM
punishments instead of the normal sentences that would have been imposed).
54. Bums, supra note 46, at 87.
55. lit at 88. At least one state, Maryland, has installed cameras in some homes as part of its monitoring
program for drunk drivers. Id. Bums also discusses the applicability of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to EM and the few cases that have dealt with EM issues. Id. at 93-98.
56. Id. at 92. While some opponents have expressed the opinion that EM is not an effective punishment,
most have focused on invasions of the individual rights of the offender. Id. at 88-92.
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting that the offenses of participants in the Chapter 122
program are generally subject to jail time and fines, not probation, and further specifying that the program is of
similar duration to that of any jail sentence that would be served by these offenders).
58. Bums, supra note 46, at 91.
59. Id. at 92.
60. See SENATE COMMrIMEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMTrEE ANALYSis OFAB 1311, at 4 (June 22,1999)
(characterizing offenders eligible for the pilot program as "low profile"). The importance of prohibiting people
from driving with suspended or revoked drivers' licenses is obvious. Non-injury, non-DUI violators of these
provisions are a comparatively less-serious subset of offenders.
61. See supra text accompanying note 4 (noting that overcrowding has resulted in releasing prisoners
early).
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does not seem likely to decrease overcrowding very much, for the program is
designed to punish a subset of new offenders who would not otherwise receive the
punishment that they should, rather than to take people out of jail and punish them
in an alternate manner. Granted, stemming the flow of new misdemeanor offenders
will help decrease the jail population to some degree, but the effect is likely to be
small.
In spite of a potentially negligible effect, however, the pilot program reflects
a commitment to punishing offenders who have violated the law. The public has
recognized the need for alternatives, and is willing to forgo incarceration for less
serious crimes, provided that offenders are subject to supervision by the system.
62
Chapter 122 is an appropriate response, mandating supervision for offenders and
allowing the State to save court costs while imposing necessary punishments and
ensuring safety for the community.63
V. CONCLUSION
Whether Chapter 122 will relieve the overcrowding problem that plagues
California's jail system is unclear.4 What the new law does seem to do is provide
an avenue for saving court time and punishing misdemeanor offenders effectively.65
While the targeted traffic offenders currently are not punished to the extent that
they would be in a system with adequate resources,6 Chapter 122 ensures that these
offenders will at least be subject to some form of punishment 67-a punishment
more strict than probation, which many Californians believe is too lenient a
punishment for these individuals.6 In this sense, Chapter 122's program is not so
much a complete solution to overcrowding itself as it is a first step toward solving
the problem of ineffective punishment of offenders. The number of misdemeanor
offenders not clogging Californiajails because of Chapter 122's program may only
62. See supra Part I.B (summarizing public attitudes toward alternative punishments).
63. By nature, home-detention/EM programs involve more supervision than does typical probation. See
supra note 33 (detailing the requirements for any home-detention program used in lieu of ajail sentence); see also
supra text accompanying note 54 (indicating that EM programs are less costly than jail); ef supra note 46 and
accompanying text (concluding that most home-detention/EM programs are successful at meeting the dual goals
of punishment and community safety).
64. See GILLIARD, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that seven of the twenty-five largest jail jurisdictions at
midyear 1998 were in California); see also IRWiN & AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 149-50 (discussing the rise in
California's prison and jail populations).
65. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (noting that trials can be costly to the State, and further
recognizing a desire to divert less serious offenses from the court system).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6 (indicating that the overcrowding problems have led to
jurisdictions releasing people early or not booking some suspects into jail).
67. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (explaining that qualified offender; may enter into
agreements to participate in an EM program in lieu of a jail sentence, in addition to paying any fine that the court
may impose).
68. See supra text accompanying note 20 (demonstrating Californians' desires for punishments more strict
than probtion).
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result in jails that are merely crowded or overcrowded, instead of grossly
overcrowded.6 9 Accordingly, Chapter 122 should be viewed merely as a provisional
remedy-a "quick fix" to be used until such time that Californians can find and
implement a more permanent solution.
69. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (explaining the extent of the overcrowding problem in
various California jail jurisdictions).
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I. INTRODUCTION
It happens too often: when a gun is readily available in a household already
fraught with domestic violence, the chances of death for either partner are greatly
increased! Even when one partner has sought refuge in the law by obtaining a
protective restraining order, the continuum of violence is not always effectively
stopped.2
Determining a need for further protection of victims of domestic abuse in 1993,
the California Legislature passed the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DPVA).3
This series of statutes created a framework that solidified domestic violence
victims' rights and allowed victims to obtain a restraining order issued by a court.
The restraining order furnishes victims a legal remedy prior to or without any
criminal conviction of the abuser.5 It also provides victims of domestic abuse a way
to isolate themselves from their abusers while resolving their domestic situations.6
Chapter 662 attempts to strengthen and augment the existing protections of
domestic violence laws. This omnibus bill8 eliminates much of the discretion that
the judiciary and police may exercise, thereby strengthening their respective roles
as an effective deterrence to continuing patterns of domestic violence.9 While the
new law is primarily reactive in nature in that it increases sentencing requirements
1. Catherine F. Klien & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis
of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 807-11 (1993); Children's Memorial Hospital,
Handguns and Family Violence (visited June 2, 1999) <http.//www.childmmc.edu/help/famviol.htm> (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. See, e.g., Carol Masciola, Restraining Orders Didn't Stop Slayings, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 3,
1999, at Al (detailing the attack by Richard Willsey on his estranged wife Nancy and her new boyfriend after she
had obtained a restraining order against Willsey); see also, e.g., Dianne Anderson, Domestic Violence and Child
Abuse Go Hand in Hand: The Death of Little Louis Stewart, PRECINCT Ri'rR., July 30, 1998, at Al (describing
the death of two-and-a-half-year old Louis Stewart at the hands of his father, Harold). In retaliation for the
restraining order placed against him, Harold had locked himself and little Louis in a car, poured flammable liquid
throughout, and lit a blaze while the mother of the child watched in horror. Id.
3. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200 (West 1994) (establishing that the division shall be entitled the Domestic
Violence Prevention Act).
4. Id. § 6220.
5. Id. § 6520(a) (West Supp. 1999); see id. (providing that issuance of a protective order requires that the
alleged victim be in "immediate and present danger of domestic violence" by the alleged abuser).
6. Id. § 6220.
7. See infra Part ll (explaining the effects of Chapter 662 on the existing constructs of domestic violence
laws); see also SENATE COMMTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 218, at 13 (Apr. 14,1999)
(stating that the author's purpose in writing the bill was to "strengthen and create various domestic violence laws
related to gun prohibition, enforcement of out-of-state restraining orders, counseling and sentencing requirements,
and domestic violence review teams").
8. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITEE, COMMITFEE ANALYSIS OF SB 218, at 2 (Apr. 7, 1999) (deeming
Chapter 662 an "omnibus bill"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (6th ed. 1990) (defining an "omnibus
bill" as" [a] legislative bill including in one act various separate and distinct matters, and frequently one joining
a number of different subjects in one measure....").
9. See infra Part I1 (noting the specific focus Chapter 662 takes in constricting the discretion given to
police officers and judges handling domestic violence offenses).
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and focuses on the law's enforcement after domestic abuse has taken place, it also
seeks to prevent further domestic abuse by continuing funding programs for women
escaping abusive partners and by removing firearms from abusers subject to
restraining orders.' 0 Chapter 662 is anticipated to substantially impact the ever-
increasing problem of domestic violence in California-if it can first overcome
potential challenges of constitutionality and judicial support."
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Domestic Violence Protective Orders
In 1993, the DVPA consolidated several bodies of law that were duplicated
elsewhere in California law.' 2 The purpose was to "prevent the recurrence of acts
of violence.., and to provide for separation of the persons involved in the domestic
violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution."'
3
Under the DVPA, protective orders can be issued either as part of ajudgment, after
notice and hearing, or ex parte, without the presence of the alleged abuser. 4 A
victim of domestic violence can seek an ex parte protective order restraining the
abusive party from general contact, a residence, or specified behavior 
5
Protective orders issued under section 6218 of the Family Code could trigger
additional restrictions on the alleged abuser's right to possess firearms. 16 Prior to
Chapter 662, section 6389 of the Family Code authorized the courts to restrict
ownership or possession of a firearm by the alleged abuser for the duration of the
10. See SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMrrrEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 218, at 1-2 (Apr. 7, 1999)
(documenting the key provisions of Chapter 662 and the purposes behind them); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 218, at 5 (July 13, 1999) (expressing that "[d]omestic violence is
the second leading cause of injury to women of all ages[;] ... SB 218 seeks to help protect women from the
unnecessary and inexcusable injury and death produced by domestic violence").
11. See infra Part IV (considering the possible challenges Chapter 662 faces in light of the Second
Amendment, and addressing disgruntled judicial officers upset about the lack of discretion in handling domestic
violence cases).
12. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200 (West 1994) (commenting on the enactment of the DVPA and its roots
in different bodies of law).
13. Id. § 6220.
14. Id. § 6218 OVest 1994).
15. See id. (providing three types of orders available to victims of domestic abuse); id. § 6320 (West 1994)
(proclaiming the court's authority to issue an "ex parte order enjoining a party from contacting, molesting,
attacking, striking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, telephoning, contacting repeatedly by mail with the
intent to harass, or disturbing the peace of the otherparty"); id. § 6321(a) (West 1994) (allowing the court to issue
ex parte orders banning an abuser from a shared residence or residence of the victim, regardless of any claim the
abuser might have of title to the dwelling); id. § 6322 (West 1994) (empowering courts to prohibit a specified
behavior of the restrained party under an ex parte order).
16. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 871, sec. 5, at I (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(a)) (providing that "[a]
person subject to a protective order, as defined in Section 6218, may not own or possess a firearm while that
protective order is in effect when prohibited by an order issued pursuant to this section").
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protective order. 17 To ensure that the alleged abuser complied, the court could issue
a relinquishment order mandating that the party surrender any firearms he or she
owned or possessed to a local police station.' 8 This surrender would occur at the
hearing for the protective order, when a court, by a preponderance of evidence,
determined that the defendant had a likelihood of committing acts of future violence
against the victim.' 9 Even where a finding of likely future acts of violence existed,
an exemption to this provision was sanctioned for a party who could demonstrate
that the possession of a firearm was necessary for his or her continued
employment.20 Ultimately, unless clear and convincing evidence existed that the
offender would act violently in the future, courts remained reluctant to confiscate
guns from domestic violence offenders.2'
Because protective orders are often issued ex parte, another requirement in the
DVPA anticipates that courts will make every effort to insure that the party subject
to the protective order understands the provisions therein.22 However, the law
requires courts to publish all written proceedings, such as court transcripts and
protective orders, in English.23 Difficulties can arise in cases in which English is not
the first language of the restrained person and that party does not have a clear
understanding of the contents of the restraining order.24
To aid in the enforcement of protective orders, the DVPA includes provisions
detailing the process for registering orders with law enforcement agencies.' After
the court issues a protective order, the details and provisions of the order are
17. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(g) (West Supp. 1999). But see id. (allowing the court to shorten the length
of time a gun restriction could be in effect). While the statute provided for a gun restriction to be in place for the
duration of a protective order, the court retained the discretion to create a shorter time frame for the gun restriction
than the protective order.
18. Id. § 6389(c). But see id. § 6389(c), (i) (permitting a party subject to the protective order to sell a
firearm to a licensed gun dealer as an alternative to surrendering the gun to the police).
19. Id. § 6389(c).
20. Id. § 6389(h).
21. See, e.g., Letter from Estelle Chun, Director of Legal Services, Asian Pacific American Legal Center
of Southern California, to Senator Hilda L. Solis (Apr. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Chun Letter] (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (detailing an occasion on which the Asian Pacific American Legal Center attempted to
get a restraining order for a client with a provision for the relinquishment of firearms by the accused offender).
The judge granted the restraining order only after deleting the relinquishment request. Id.
22. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6304 (amended by Chapter 662) (dictating that the court will inform the
offender of the provisions of the protective order, including any requirements of firearm relinquishment and
penalties for violations of the order); see, e.g., id. § 6384(a) (West Supp. 1999) (asserting that personal service
of a protective order is not necessary where both parties are present at the hearing and have received actual notice
of the provisions of the order). Thus, personal service of protective orders is necessary where the order was issued
by the court ex parte. Id. § 6389(g).
23. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 185 (amended by Chapter 662) (clarifying that "[e]very written
proceeding in a court of justice in this state shall be in the English language, and judicial proceedings shall be
conducted, preserved, and published in no other" language).
24. See SENATEJUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, COMMITEEANALYSIS OFSB 218, at 5 (Apr. 7, 1999) (stating that
the intent of Chapter 662 is to make a comprehensible copy of the protective order accessible to the subject of the
order).
25. CAL FAM. CODE §§ 6380,6380.5,6381 (West Supp. 1999).
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entered into the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS)
and become part of the Domestic Violence Protective Order Registry.26 The
protective order becomes enforceable when the proper law enforcement authorities
have received a copy of it, an officer is shown a physical copy, or an officer gains
information of the order's existence through the Domestic Violence Restraining
Order Registry.27 Whether or not the order is properly registered with CLETS, the
order is enforceable anywhere within the State.
28
Protective orders issued by out-of-state courts can be entered into the Domestic
Violence Restraining Order Registry at the request of the victim.29 Valid out-of-
state protective orders are "accorded full faith and credit by the courts of this state,
and shall be enforced... as if [they] had been issued in this state."30 Absent from
the language of this section is an answer to the question of whether the out-of-state
order is intended to be enforced in accordance with the terms as written by the out-
of-state court or whether the order is to be enforced as if it had been written and
issued by a California court.31
Finally, a knowing and willful violation of a court order is punishable as a
misdemeanor with the possible sentence of one year in jail, a fine of $1,000, or
both. 2 The same penalty applies for possession or ownership of a gun if a
relinquishment order is violated.3
B. Police Enforcement of Domestic Violence Laws
After the issuance of a protective order, the effectiveness of that order largely
depends on enforcement by the police 4 Police officers currently have broad
discretion when enforcing protective orders. 5 Officers called to the scene of
domestic violence have the authority to confiscate any firearms viewed in plain
sight or discovered during a consensual search of the premises. 6 However, this
authority is limited to that which is necessary to protect themselves or others from
26. Id. § 6380(a).
27. Id. § 6381(b).
28. Id. § 6381(a).
29. 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 702, sec. 2, at 19 (amending CAL FAM. CODE § 6380.5(b)).
30. 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 702, sec. 2, at 19 (amending Cal. FAM. CODE § 6380.5(c)).
31. Id.
32. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 795, sec. 12, at 2713 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 273.6).
33. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 871, sec. 2 (enacting CAL FAM. CODE § 6389(m)).
34. See SENATE RLES COMmrrrm, FLOOR ANALYSIS OFSB 218, at 5-6 (May 21, 1999) (illustrating how
SB 218 diminishes some of the discretion officers have in their approach to domestic violence calls, "providing
more uniform enforcement throughout California").
35. Id.
36. See 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 901, sec. 1, at 340-41 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 12028.5(b)) (allowing an
officer to take temporary custody of a firearm if necessary for the protection of the peace officer or other persons
present).
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further violence.37 Thus, if a domestic abuser appears calm and rational at the time
the officers arrive, or threatens to harm a person not present at the scene, officers
may not be compelled to confiscate a weapon visible in plain sight.38
Additionally, because violations of protective orders are punishable as a
misdemeanor, officers responding to a violation of a protective order are authorized
to arrest the subject only if they have probable cause to believe that a knowing and
willful violation occurred.39 While officers are trained to inform victims of their
right to place an abuser under citizen's arrest,40 often victims of domestic abuse are
too intimidated to follow through with a citizen's arrest.41 Thus, many domestic
calls to which police officers respond result in unresolved issues and a potential for
future violence.42
C. Penalties for Repeat Domestic Violence Offenders
Penalties for repeat domestic violence offenses combine relatively light jail
sentences with questionable counseling programs offered in conjunction with
probation. A domestic violence offender who abuses his spouse twice within seven
years qualifies for a sentence of ninety-six hours of jail time and participation in a
batterer's treatment program.43 Additionally, if he has two or more prior convictions
of domestic violence within a seven-year period, the next offense requires a
37. Id.
38. See Letter from Marci Fukuroda, Attorney, California Women's Law Center, to Senator Hilda L. Solis,
at I (Mar. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Fukuroda Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (claiming that:
[d]uring the week of February 22nd, the Law Center received calls from two women who reported that
law enforcement officers failed to remove guns found in plain sight at the scene of a domestic violence
incident. Thus, when the officers left the home, the abuser was not only more enraged by the
interference, but was also armed);
see, e.g., Renee Esfandiary & Krista Newkirk, Interview with the Honorable John E. Klock of the Alexandria
Circuit Court Defending Mandatory Arrest, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 241, 241 (1997) (observing what
Alexandria Circuit Judge John Klock feels is the reason for mandatory arrest policies and stronger domestic
violence laws; "many times the police officers may have felt that perhaps the case was resolved when he or she
was at the scene, when in actuality the conflict was not resolved. This led to more violence... ").
39. See 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 995, sec. 1, at 5668 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1)).
40. See id. (prompting officers at the scene of a domestic violence call to inform the alleged victim of his
or her right to make a citizen's arrest, and discussing methods to safely carry out the arrest).
41. See Machaela M. Hoctor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory
Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. Rev. 643,674-75 (1997) (explaining that "asking a victim in front of her abuser
whether she wants to make a citizen's arrest places her in a very difficult situation. Even if she wants her abuser
arrested, she may be too afraid to say so in front of him").
42. See Fukuroda Letter, supra note 38, at 1 (stressing the hazards to domestic violence victims where
officers arrive at the scene, interrupt an abusive situation, but leave without resolving the conflict).
43. See 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 912, sec. 3, at 2786 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(f)-(g); 1994 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 873, sec. I (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.55); 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 795, sec. 12, at 2713 (enacting
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.56).
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minimum sentence of thirty days in jail.44 The court has discretion to waive the
sentence and grant probation if it finds good cause for an exception. s
The creation of the batterer's treatment programs stems from the elimination
of "diversion programs" in 1996, as an alternative for domestic violence
offenders.46 However, counseling programs, deemed batterer's programs, became
a popular addition to probation sentencing options.47 The difficulty with these
batterer's programs is that no criteria exists that the programs must fulfill. 8 Thus,
a problem remains with the variability of the programs. 49 The number of hours
spent, the type of counseling exercises available, and the qualifications of the
counselors running the programs are not monitored or standardized. 0 Therefore,
while some batterer programs may be effective forms of treatment, others may
simply be a meeting place for domestic abusers.
D. Preventative Measures and Support for Domestic Violence Victims
In addition to punishing domestic violence offenders, the State also recognizes
the importance of providing abuse victims with support. Shelter, advocacy, and
distribution of information concerning domestic violence are powerful tools used
to help domestic violence victims escape abusive situations.52 A system of battered
women shelters was created to furnish a safe environment, support, and legal
services for women escaping violent relationships.53 Programs offered up to
eighteen months of support services, including housing, job assistance, and
counseling.5 An advisory council researched and provided expert insight into the
issue of domestic violence and possible ways to gather the funds necessary to
44. See 1977 Cal. Stat. ch 912, sec. 3, at 2786 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5).
45. Id.
46. CAL PENAL CODE § 1203.097 (West 1995); see also Melissa Hooper, When Domestic Violence
Diversion IsNo Longer an Option: What to Do with the Female Offenders, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 168, 170-
72 (1996) (observing that diversion programs, created to rehabilitate domestic violence offenders, were
discontinued after a determination that they were ineffective).
47. See 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 219, sec. 154, at 1662 (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE § 6343) (allowing courts to
prescribe batterer's treatment programs for defendants as part of probation after sentencing).
48. See id. (lacking details or specifications that treatment programs for domestic violence offenders must
meet).
49. See Hooper, supra note 46, at 170 (claiming that variability and lack of uniformity in the diversion
programs was a problem because the hours, topics covered, and goals of the programs were not standardized).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See infra note 53 and accompanying text (explaining that California has established a network of legal
assistance, temporary shelter, job counseling, and emotional support groups for women attempting to escape a
violent domestic relationship).
53. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124250 (West Supp. 2000) (creating a system of shelters to
provide legal and emotional support as well as a safe place to stay for women and children escaping an abusive
environment).
54. Id.
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support the programs to which women turn when escaping an abusive
environment."5 However, authority for the advisory council expired on January 1,
1998.56
Finally, efforts to increase information about the epidemic of domestic violence
in California have led to the creation of domestic violence death review teams.5 7
These domestic violence death review teams are necessary where domestic abuse
culminates in a homicide and/or suicide. Counties may establish interagency death
review teams for the purpose of research and data gathering, but strict
confidentiality requirements hinder the sharing of information between the teams .1
These requirements can prevent death review teams from sharing valuable
information with each other, such as "medical records, child abuse reports, [and]
juvenile court proceedings. '' 9
III. CHAPTER 662
Because domestic violence laws are inadequate to stem the rising epidemic of
domestic violence in California, Chapter 662 arms the judicial system and other
government agencies with more effective tools to punish abusers and aid domestic
violence victims.'
A. Domestic Violence Protective Orders Under Chapter 662
Under Chapter 662, when a section 6218 domestic violence protective order is
issued, courts are now required to give notice to the subject of the order that any
possession, ownership, purchase, or receipt of a firearm violates the terms of the
protective order.6' This makes ownership and possession of a firearm illegal, along
with the purchase or receipt of a firearm, while the party is subject to a restraining
order.62 Subsequently, all parties subject to a domestic violence protective order are
55. See 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 97, sec. 7, at 3 (enacting CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124251)
(developing an agency responsible for providing assistance and expertise in providing shelter and support for
battered women).
56. Id.
57. See 1995 Cal. Stat. ch. 710, sec. 1 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 11163.3) (establishing interagency
domestic violence death review teams).
58. Id.
59. SENATECOMMITrEEONPUBuCSAFETy,COMM1rrEEANALYSIS OFSB 218, at 12-13 (Apr. 13, 1999).
60. See SENATEJuDtCIARYCoMMrrrEF- COMMrrrEEANALYsiS OFSB 218, at 5 (Apr. 6,1999) (stating the
sponsor's attempt to improve currently insufficient protection to the domestic violence victims after protective
orders are obtained); Letter from May Mitchell, Legal Program Manager, Haven Women's Center of Stanislaus,
to Senator Hilda L. Solis, at I (Mar. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Mitchell Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (proclaiming strong support for the bill's numerous provisions aimed at strengthening domestic violence
laws).
61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6304 (amended by Chapter 662).
62. Id.
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required to relinquish all firearms in their possession or control.63 The court is no
longer required to find a likelihood of future acts of violence. 4 This provision is
mandatory and no longer at the discretion of the court.6
While all judicial proceedings will continue to be conducted, and all written
documents will continue to be promulgated in English, Chapter 662 addresses the
need for non-English-speaking parties to understand the provisions to which they
are subject under court orders.6 Courts are permitted to provide unofficial
translations of protective orders in languages other than English, where deemed
necessary.67 The Judicial Council will also make translations of protective order
forms in languages other than English available to all courts by July 1, 2001 if
appropriate.
68
Chapter 662 goes further to clarify the intended enforcement of out-of-state
protective orders.69 Language in Chapter 662 now elaborates that enforcement of
out-of-state orders shall comply with the terms as written in the protective order of
the originating state.70 Therefore, the new gun prohibition accompanying a
California domestic violence protective order will not apply to out-of-state orders
unless a relinquishment provision is incorporated into the terms of that order from
that sister state.
71
B. Police Enforcement Under Chapter 662
Along with bolstering the judicial enforcement of protective orders against
domestic violence offenders, police officers are now obligated to arrest subjects on
misdemeanor charges for violating protective orders, even if the violation does not
63. Id. § 6389(b) (amended by Chapter 662).
64. See id. § 6389(c) (amended by Chapter 662) (deleting the need for a finding by a preponderance of
evidence that the alleged abuser is a threat to the alleged victim).
65. See id. (abolishing the court's authority to shorten or extend the duration of the relinquishment order);
id. § 6389(b) (amended by Chapter 662) (using definitive language to require the issuance of a relinquishment
order in conjunction with a domestic violence protective order).
66. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 185(b) (amended by Chapter 662) (declaring that court orders and forms
will be made available by the Judicial Council in languages other than English); id. § 185(a) (amended by Chapter
662) (allowing unofficial translations of court orders to be distributed in other languages); SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMnTEE. COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 218, at 5 (Apr. 6, 1999) (explaining the author's intent to provide a
comprehensible copy of court proceedings for a party subject to a protective order). But see Chun Letter, supra
note 21, at I (arguing that Chapter 662 "must include funding and mandated language in order to be effective).
Otherwise, many family law court judges may find this merely a nuisance, ignoring the potential benefits of
offering court orders in languages other than English. Id.
67. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 185(a) (amended by Chapter 662).
68. Id. § 135(b).
69. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6380.5(c) (amended by Chapter 662) (supporting the enforcement of out-of-
state protective orders and the "terms, as written" as if it is a California protective order); supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text (illustrating how existing law was not clear as to the terms of such enforcement).
70. CAL FAM. CODE § 6380.5(c) (amended by Chapter 662).
71. Telephone Interview with Giannina Perez, Legislative Aide to Senator Hilda Solis, Sacramento, Cal.
(Aug. 3, 1999) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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occur in the officer's presence.12 The officer still must ascertain whether he or she
has probable cause to believe that the subject knows of the order and acted in
violation of the order, but the officer no longer has to witness the misdemeanor take
place to effectuate an arrest.73 Furthermore, officers responding to a domestic
violence call shall take into temporary custody any firearms viewed in plain sight
or found during a consensual search of the premises.74
C. Increased Penalties for Repeat Domestic Violence Offenders
To bolster the punitive repercussions of repeat acts of domestic violence,
Chapter 662 increases sentencing and probation requirements for domestic violence
offenders having more than one conviction.7" A domestic violence offender who
commits a second offense within seven years of his or her first offense will face a
minimum of fifteen days in jail rather than the ninety-six hours imposed prior to
Chapter 662.76 Upon a third offense within seven years, the minimum jail time
increases to sixty days.' This is double the previous mandatory term of thirty
days.
78
Chapter 662 also sets a new standard for court-prescribed batterer's treatment
programs.79 All such programs must now meet approval by the probation
department or be a substantive equivalent to the programs approved by the
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (amended by Chapter 662).
73. Id.
74. See CAL PENAL CODE § 12028.5(b) (amended by Chapter 662) (requiring that officers at the scene of
a domestic violence call that involves threat of physical assault or death remove any firearms found in plain view
or upon a consensual search of the premises. This does not require a determination by the officers that there is a
future threat of violence in order to confiscate the firearm.); Rick Orlov, Tougher Domestic Volence Laws Urged;
State Legislator Suggests Gun Restrictions, More Enforcement of Restraining Orders, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Feb.
5, 1999, at NI0 (rendering a simplified view of the bill as granting the police power to "remove any guns found
in a house when they respond to a domestic violence case").
75. See CAL PENAL CODE § 273.5(g) (amended by Chapter 662) (increasing minimum sentencing
requirements for repeat domestic violence offenses); SENATE COMMITEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OFSB 218, at I I (Apr. 14,1999) (asserting that Chapter 662 "would retain current imprisonment terms,
but would restructure and recast these mandatory minimum jail penalties").
76. CAL PENAL CODE § 273.5(g).
77. Id.
78. Compare 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 662, sec. 10-11, at 18 (repealing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273.55,
273.56) (providing for a minimum jail sentence of 96 hours for a repeat offender with one prior conviction within
seven years. A minimum jail sentence of 30 days is imposed when there are two or more prior convictions within
a seven year period.), with CAL PENAL CODE § 273.5(g) (amended by Chapter 662) (incorporating the basic
elements of sections 273.55 and 273.56 into this new, stronger sentencing requirement, thereby, repealing the old
statutes).
79. See CAL. FA M. CODE § 6343(a) (amended by Chapter 662) (specifying that if an offender is referred
to a batterer's treatment program as part of probation, the program must be approved by the probation department
according to the provisions of California Penal Code section 1203.097); CAL PENAL CODE § 1203.097(c) (West
Supp. 2000) (establishing requirements for batterer's treatment programs that include goals for any such program,
educational programming available, a mandate that the defendant participate in same-gender group counseling
sessions, and strategies to make the defendant take responsibility for abusive behavior).
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probation department.80 Chapter 662 also calls for the courts to issue a referral list
of services and programs available to domestic violence offenders.81
D. Additional Support for Domestic Violence Victims
Under Chapter 662, the Maternal and Child Health Branch of the State
Department of Health Services remains responsible for providing grants to a
network of support systems for victims of domestic abuse.82 The existing sunset
provision was removed, and an advisory council to the Department of Health
Services will continue to aid the agency in the distribution and determination of
grants. Furthermore, Chapter 662 extends the length of time that victims of
domestic violence can utilize programs and services offered by the Department of
Health Services.'
Finally, in an effort to compile better research on domestic violence and its
societal impacts, Chapter 662 rids the law of confidentiality restrictions between
agencies and death review teams regarding deaths occurring from suspected
domestic violence.85
IV. POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WiTH CHAFTER 662
A. Second Amendment Issues
1. An Introduction to the Federal/State Incorporation Dichotomy
Ongoing debate exists as to the scope of the Second Amendment guarantee, but
to-date, the Supreme Court has made no clear determination as to whether the
Second Amendment applies to the states.86 Currently, the Ninth Circuit refuses to
80. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6346(a).
81. Id. § 6343(b) (amended by Chapter 662).
82. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124250(b) (amended by Chapter 662) (declaring that the
"Maternal and Child Health Branch shall administer a comprehensive shelter-based services grant program to
battered women's shelters pursuant to this section").
83. See id. § 124250(d) (amended by Chapter 662) (reinstating the advisory council to the Department of
Health and Services).
84. See id. § 124250(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 662) (continuing grants to programs that offer up to 24
months of housing, counseling, case management, job assistance, and education in parenting and budgeting for
battered women). This extends the amount of time women have to stay in the programs from the prior 18 month
limit to 24 months. Id.
85. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11163.3(f)-(g) (amended by Chapter 662); see also SENATE JUDICIARY
CoMir=E, COMMrra ANALYSIS OF SB 218, at 9 (Apr. 6, 1999) (clarifying that decreasing confidentiality
restrictions on members of death review teams will effectively "foster the free flow of information between
members of the review team and their respective agencies").
86. United States v. Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
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recognize the incorporation of the Second Amendment against states.8 7 In Fresno
Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kanp 88, the court cited the Supreme Court holdings
in United States v. Cruikshank09 and United States v. Presser9 as precedent for
limiting application of the Second Amendment to actions of the federal Congress."
In addition, the Fresno Rifle court cited Miller v. Texas92 as support for Cruikshank,
noting its statement "'that the restrictions of [the Second Amendment] operate only
upon the Federal power."' 93 However, all three of the subsequent cases "predate the
first Supreme Court decision incorporating a provision of the Bill of Rights through
the Fourteenth Amendment." 94 Because the question of the Second Amendment's
application to state law through the Fourteenth Amendment has never been squarely
addressed by the Court, this remains an open question."
2. Possible Consequences of State Incorporation
Due to the continued debate over the scope and application of the Second
Amendment, a consideration of the possible consequences to Chapter 662 firearm
provisions should the Supreme Court determine that Second Amendment
guarantees are applicable against the states is warranted. If the Supreme Court were
to determine that the Second Amendment is applicable to the states, a Second
Amendment analysis of Chapter 662 would then turn on whether the Second
Amendment is read to guarantee an individual the right to bear arms, or whether the
guarantee is a collective one ensuring states' ability to maintain a militia.96 Such an
analysis depends upon arguments surrounding federal law, because state law is
currently shielded by the ongoing incorporation debate.97
In 1994, the federal government sought to strengthen federal laws against
domestic violence.98 Under the Commerce Clause, 99 Congress passed 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922, which addresses federal firearm regulations.'tu One provision in the federal
87. Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98,103 n.10 (1996); Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965
F.2d 723, 731 (1992).
88. 965 F.2d 723 (1992).
89. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
90. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
91. Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 729-30.
92. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
93. Fresno Rijfle, 965 F.2d at 730 (quoting United States v. Miller, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894)).
94. Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 730.
95. Id.
96. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the legality of a similar federal provision that has given context to the
ongoing argument over the scope of the Second Amendment).
97. Supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
98. See Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 591 ("The statute in question in this case is aimed at preventing the
family violence that seems epidemic in this country.").
99. See U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. (establishing the Congressional power to "regulate Commerce...
among the several States... ,).
100. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West Supp. 1999).
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statute provides restrictions against gun possession and transportation by persons
subject to protective orders.0 t Any state court order issued after a hearing with
notice and opportunity to participate given to the party subject to the order triggers
the federal statute. t°2 The protective order must indicate either that: (1) a court made
a finding that the party subject to the order posed a reasonable threat of future
violence; or (2) that the order contains terms specifically prohibiting threats or
physical force against an intimate partner or child.'0 3 Thus, while this statute
restricts the person's ability to possess and transport firearms, the purpose behind
this section is to enforce more stringently the domestic violence laws.'
Individuals subject to protective orders under state law are subject to
prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8) ("§ 988(g)(8)"). In the course of
those proceedings, the constitutionality of the federal statute has been raised based
on potential violations of the Second and Fifth Amendments. The results of these
cases could be telling if Chapter 662 faces similar challenges.' 05
In United States v. Emerson,1 Emerson was subject to a temporary restraining
order, frequently used in Texas divorce proceedings to protect financial assets of
the marriage prior to dissolution, but was not informed that the order would trigger
a federal law prohibiting possession of a gun while the order was in effect. 07
Emerson claimed that § 922 (g)(8) violated his Second Amendment right to bear
arms.'1° The court reasoned that "[o]nly if the Second Amendment guarantees
Emerson a personal right to bear arms can he claim a constitutional violation.' ' lw
101. See id. § 922(g)(8)-(9) (West Supp. 1999) (making it unlawful for any person subject to a court order
that:
((A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person
had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an
intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other
conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or the
child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety
of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury; or (9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence, to ship, or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.)
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (indicating the intent of Congress in passing 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922(g)(8)).
105. See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 598 (exemplifying an argument that could potentially be brought
to challenge California's Chapter 662).
106. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
107. Id. at 599.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Thus, the court analyzed the validity of an individual's right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment. 10
Based on a lengthy dissection of the debate over the Second Amendment, the
Emerson court concluded that the great number of courts finding the Second
Amendment to guarantee a collective right to the states had erred."' With a
substantial focus on the text of the Second Amendment, historical construction, and
the Framers' intentions, the court found that the Second Amendment of the
Constitution "guarantees a personal right to bear arms" rather than a "collective
right.""' 2 Focusing first on the text of the Second Amendment," 3 the court
concluded that in a plain language reading, the subordinate clause preceding the
actual right was expressing the reason for the right, and not qualifying it."
4
Secondly, in a historical context, the court argued that the framers intended to
model the Bill of Rights after the English Bill of Rights to recognize every citizen's
individual right to bear arms."' Additionally, the court claimed that the very
inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights indicated the Framers'
intent to create an individual right." 6 "After all, the Bill of Rights is not a bill of
states' rights, but a bill of rights retained by the people." 117 The court further
acknowledged that many courts have concluded differently," 8 thus creating
substantial persuasive opinions that the Second Amendment confers only a
"collective right" upon the states."9 However, it also recognized that a conclusive
Supreme Court decision determining the implications of Second Amendment
guarantees to individual citizens has yet to be promulgated.' 20 Due primarily to the
historical and textual analysis, along with the court's expressed desire to "zealously
guard" the rights of the Second Amendment as it would any other "individual
liberty enshrined in the Bill of Rights," the court held that the Second Amendment
110. See id. at 600-10 (weighing the arguments from "state's rights" proponents with those of the "collective
rights" advocates, breaking its analysis down into sections of textual analysis, historical factors, structural analysis,
prior judicial interpretations, and prudential concerns.)
111. See id. at 610 (opining that "[t]he rights of the Second Amendment should be as zealously guarded as
the other individual liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights").
112. See id. at 600 (diferentiating between the two different schools ofthought on the Second Amendment).
But see id. at 607 (noting that "several other federal courts have held that the Second Amendment does not
establish an individual right to keep and bear arns, but rather a 'collective' right, or a right held by the states").
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1I ("A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.').
114. See id. at 600-01 ("The plain language of the amendment, without attenuate inferences therefrom,
shows that the function of the subordinate clause was not to qualify the right, but instead to show why it must be
protected. The right exists independent of the existence of the militia.").
115. Id. at 607.
116. Id.
117. David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the SecondAmendment Matters, 98 BYU L. REV. 55, 60
(1998).
118. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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did indeed confer upon Emerson an individual right to bear arms.12 Thus,
Emerson's challenge to 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (g)(8) was valid, because the statute had
deprived him of his right as an individual to possess a firearm that had been shipped
or transported via interstate commerce.' 22
Several months later, a federal district court in United States v. Spruill1
23
directly countered the Emerson holding and upheld the constitutionality of § 922
(g)(8). 2 1 While the Spruill court admitted the nonexistence of a Fifth Circuit ruling
concerning a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8), it also observed that
five other circuits provide persuasive authority defining the Second Amendment as
a collective right rather than an individual right.'21
Further, the only relatively current Supreme Court decision on the scope of the
Second Amendment was issued in 1939. 126 In United States v. Miller,127 the
Supreme Court stirred much of the current debate by holding that the federal
government could require registration of certain types of firearms, but stopped short
of permitting the federal government to ban individual possession of all weapons.1
28
Thus, based on Miller, the majority of federal circuits have held consistently that
"the Second Amendment does not prohibit the... government from imposing some
restrictions on private gun ownership."'29 Hence, where Emerson parted with the
majority path and found the Second Amendment to confer an individual right to
bear arms, 30 Spruill and other circuit courts have remained steadfast in limiting the
Second Amendment to a collective right enjoyed by the states.
Chapter 662's firearms provisions were mirrored after those in § 922 (g)(8)."3'
However, at this time, the majority of jurisdictions define the Second Amendment
121. Id. at 610.
122. See id. at 610 (holding that "18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional because it allows a state court
divorce proceeding, without particularized finding of the threat of future violence, to automatically deprive a
citizen of his Second Amendment rights").
123. 61 F Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. 'rex. 1999).
124. Id. at 591.
125. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 1999); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98,
100-01 (9th Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d
103, 106-07; Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 920-23 (1st Cir. 1942). See also Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d
98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that state action on the part of California in denying Mr. Hickman the firearm
permit he desired was not violative of the Second Amendment because the Second Amendment "is a right held
by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a private citizen"). This is an important case
because any challenges of Chapter 662 on the basis of Second Amendment rights would likely be heard in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
126. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939).
127. 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939).
128. Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 590-91.
129. Id. at 591.
130. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (explaining the holding in Emerson as parting with the
majority view of Second Amendment rights).
131. See ASSEMBLYCOMMI-TrEEONPUBUCSAFETY,COMMrrrEEANALYSISOFSB 213, at 5 (July 13,1999)
(clarifying that Chapter 662's firearms provisions were tailored to incorporate the stricter provisions of federal
law).
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in the limited context of conferring a state-held right. 3 2 More specifically to
California, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has already aligned itself with the
majority in upholding the Second Amendment as a "collective right."'33 While the
majority view probably will remain a valid precedent in California, a potential still
exists for a Supreme Court decision to change the current trend in Second
Amendment analysis.1 14 Until that time, Chapter 662, like § 922(g)(8),will likely
remain a valid constitutional restraint the state may place on its citizen's right to
bear arms.
B. A Due Process Challenge to Chapter 662
As does § 922(g)(8), Chapter 662 removes any requirement that a court find by
a preponderance of evidence that a person subject to a restraining order is a threat
to his or her intimate partner or children. 135 Some may argue that the new California
law violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause because the provision
is automatic in nature and a protective order can be issued in the absence of the
person subject to the order. 36 Thus, a person subject to a protective order in
California could lose her right to possess, own, or purchase a firearm without a
court ever having determined that she poses a threat to the party seeking the
protective order.
37
Chapter 662 may be overbroad, as all that is "required for prosecution [under
the [new law] is a boilerplate order with no particularized findings."' 38 However,
unlike the federal law, Chapter 662 does specify that only protective orders
procured under the Family Code enjoining general contact with the victim,
disallowing specific behavior, or excluding the abusive party from a certain
dwelling, will attach the firearm relinquishment provision. 39 This does not
encompass protective orders such as the one in Emerson that was issued
automatically upon the initiation of dissolution proceedings to protect marital
assets. 40 Thus, a California court's issuance of a protective order under Chapter 662
132. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (providing a list of several circuit courts applying the
"collective right" theory).
133. Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1996).
134. See United States v. Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Tex. 1999) ("Someday there will
undoubtedly be a clear cut opinion from the Supreme Court on the Second Amendment. Without more at this time,
however, the Court chooses to follow the majority path ....).
135. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6389(a), 6304 (amended by Chapter 662).
136. Id. § 6389(a), (c) (amended by Chapter 662). See generally Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 598, 611-12
(making an identical argument that the automatic nature of § 922 (g)(8) violates Due Process requirements).
137. See CAL FAM. CODE § 6389(a) (amended by Chapter 662) (requiring the relinquishment of firearms
by any person subject to a protective order, regardless of whether the court makes a finding of future threat or not).
138. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 611.
139. See CAL FAM. CODE § 6389(a) (amended by Chapter 662).
140. See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (discussing the type of protective order to which Emerson was
subject).
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could be read as requiring a "particularized finding" of abuse, even if not a finding
of potential for future acts of violence, which might be enough to satisfy any
constitutional challenge.
41
C. The Impact of Diminishing Judicial and Police Discretion
Chapter 662 also diminishes the discretion of police officers and courts in
domestic violence cases.1 42 The California Judge's Association voiced concern
about requiring batterer's treatment programs to be authorized by the probation
department.143 Similarly, mandating relinquishment of firearms, rather than leaving
the matter to judicial discretion, removes the ability of judges to decide the matter
on a case-by-case basis.' 44
Recently, however, "the National Institute of Justice found that most judges
have outdated, and even improper, views concerning domestic violence.' 45 This is
pertinent because "[the] effectiveness of protection orders is also determined largely
by whether they are consistently enforced."'146 Thus, to aid in the full enforcement
of protective orders, Chapter 662 could have called for more judicial education on
domestic violence and given sitting judges the insight they need to wield their
judicial discretion. Instead, however, its drafters chose to remove some of the
discretion judges previously employed.
More worrisome, perhaps, is this same argument as it relates to police officers
in the field. On the one hand, Chapter 662, by mandating the removal of firearms
found at a domestic violence scene, addresses situations wherein police officers
may misjudge the status of hostilities between the parties. 47 On the other hand,
Chapter 662 does not address scenarios wherein the gun found may belong to the
141. See id. at 610-11 (finding that "[i]f the statute only criminalized gun possession based upon a court
order with particularized finding of the likelihood of violence, then the statute would not be so offensive, because
there would be a reasonable nexus between gun possession and the threat of violence"). The court did not require
a "particularized finding of the likelihood" of future acts of violence, only a likelihocd of violence. Id. A
likelihood of violence might arguably be shown in evidence of prior acts of domestic abuse.
142. See SENATEJUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, CoMMrEEANALYSiS OFSB 218, at 6 (Apr. 7, 1999) (noting the
concern of the California Judge's Association that the language of the bill limits a judge's discretion to refer a
restrained party to a batterer's treatment program); id. at 8 (indicating the need for continued discretion on the part
of police officers to respond to a domestic violence call without necessarily arresting anyone).
143. Id. at 6.
144. SENATE COMMrTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OFSB 218, at 16 (Apr. 14,1999).
145. Klien, supra note 1, at 811. "Prior to receiving training, many judges believe that domestic violence
consists of verbal harassment or a rare shove, and that domestic violence was a 'relationship problem' amenable
to marriage counseling .... Unfortunately, judicial education on domestic violence has only reached a relatively
small number of judges across the country." Id.
146. Id. at 813.
147. See Esfandiary & Newkirk, supra note 38 (supporting why mandatory arrests where institutcd in
domestic violence cases in Virginia).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
victim.'4 8 Instead, it would mandate the removal of any firearm by police,
regardless of ownership, if found in plain sight or during a consensual search. 49
Thus, this provision might lead to officers removing a means of defense from the
victim, rather than confiscating a weapon of attack from the abuser. 150
Finally, Chapter 662 creates a provision similar to Virginia's well-established
mandatory arrest policy. 151 Officers on a domestic violence call who have cause to
believe a suspect has notice of a protective order are required to make a warrantless
arrest of the subject, whether or not the violation of the protective order occurred
in the officers' presence.15 2 This may reduce the officers' discretion as to how to
handle domestic violence calls, but the benefit is a uniform enforcement of
protective orders and less need to second-guess the intent of the suspect, risking the
safety of the victim. A second plausible benefit of mandatory arrests is that such
arrests would promote prosecution and stricter enforcement of protective orders at
all levels of the judicial system,1 53 thus fulfilling the intended destiny of Chapter
662 by adding strength and teeth to the enforcement of domestic violence protective
orders.1 4
V. CONCLUSION
At the heart of Chapter 662 is a clear intent to strengthen laws designed to
eliminate family violence in California.5 5 Because domestic violence is such a
difficult crime to eliminate, Chapter 662 attempts to effect change in numerous
areas of law. 156 Chapter 662 provides continued resources to battered women trying
to escape a violent environment, prevents abusers from possessing firearms,
supplies more comprehensive and comprehensible information to persons subject
148. See SENATEJUDICIARYCOMMITEECOMM1TrEEANALYISoFSB 218, at9 (Apr. 7 1999) (remarking
that there is potential for an officer required to take temporary custody of a gun in plain sight, or seen during a
consensual search, to confiscate a gun that actually belongs to the victim, rather than the abuser).
149. CAL- PENAL CODE § 12028.5(a)(3Xb) (amended by Chapter 662).
150. But see Children's Memorial Hospital, supra note I (warning that the "presence of a gun in a battering
relationship appears to increase the chance of death for both partners."). The statistic provided substantiates the
argument that confiscation of firearms as the scene of domestic violence is a positive change in the law regardless
of ownership of the weapon. Id.
151. See Esfandiary & Newkirk, supra note 38 (interviewing Alexandria Circuit Judge John Klock about
Virginia's mandatory arrest policy that has been in use for ten years).
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 662).
153. See, e.g., Esfandiary & Newkirk, supra note 38 (pointing to Judge Klock's experience with mandatory
arrests and noting that he promotes a "no-drop policy with regards to prosecution").
154. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSlS OFSB 218, at 2 (Apr. 7, 1999) (reporting
that the intent behind Chapter 662 is to fortify existing domestic violence laws).
155. Id.
156. See supra Part I (outlining the substantive changes Chapter 662 makes innumerous current California
statutes).
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to court orders, and lengthens minimum jail sentences for repeat offenders. 57 All
of these changes are positive steps forward.
However, depending on future Supreme Court decisions regarding
incorporation of the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, Chapter
662 might face possible challenges due to its similarity to § 922(g)(8), t5' which at
least one court has found to be unconstitutional.'59 With any luck, the Supreme
Court will provide clarification soon as to the scope of the Second Amendment and
end the ongoing debate. Until then, Chapter 662 likely will remain unscathed by
any Second Amendment challenges.
157. See supra Part El (detailing the changes made to the California Family, Penal and Heath and Welfare
Codes).
158. See supra Part IV.A (delineating the possible Second Amendment issues if the Second Amendment
is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment by future court decisions and providing, as an example, a recent
challenge to the similar federal statute).
159. See supra notes 106-10 (explaining the recent challenge to federal statute § 922(g)(8) and subsequent
decision by the Emerson court to interpret the Second Amendment as granting an individual the right to bear
arms).
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